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Abstract
The deregulation of the electricity industry is currently on the political agenda in many
countries. In most countries, the deregulation of the sector is combined with a (re-) regulation
of the electricity networks in most of the countries. In many countries incentive-based
regulation – e.g. price-cap regulation, yardstick regulation – was introduced to
promote efficiency improvements in electricity networks. However, with information
asymmetry between regulator and network owners, companies who are subject to an
incentive-based regulation will be able to obtain an information rent. Benchmarking
can help to address this regulator’s concern that it does not have good information
about the scope for a company to make cost efficiencies (an asymmetry of information).
In this paper, we analyze the costs structure of Swiss electricity distribution network operators
with respect to cost and scale efficiency of the industry. A stochastic frontier model is applied to
estimate the average costs of efficient network operators as a benchmark for the industry.
Keywords: stochastic frontier analysis; electricity distribution; efficiency measurement;
network, access price regulation; benchmarking
JEL classification: L94; R32; L43
11. Introduction
For more than ten years, the deregulation of the electricity industry is on the political
agenda in many countries. Since electricity networks are viewed as natural monopolies,
the deregulation of the sector is typically accompanied by the regulation of the network
access prices. In many countries incentive-based regulation – e.g. price-cap regulation,
yardstick regulation – was introduced to promote efficiency improvements in electricity
networks. However, with information asymmetry between regulator and network
owners, companies who are subject to an incentive-based regulation will be able to
obtain an information rent.1 Benchmarking can help to address the regulator’s concern
that he does not have good information about the scope for a company to make cost
efficiencies (an asymmetry of information). Essentially, any benchmarking technique is
a system whereby the ratios of a firm’s inputs to outputs, the production costs or the
quality are compared to external references. For instance, by comparing the costs of
similar companies the regulator can establish a set of “yardsticks” of performance from
which he could infer any one firm’s attainable cost efficiency level. In doing so the
dependence of the price that any company received on its own cost level would be
broken. Therefore, benchmarking analysis can be used to set the informational basis for
a more effective regulation because it reduces the informational asymmetries between
firms and regulator regarding costs.
In the application of many incentive-based regulation models regulators, generally,
make use of some form of benchmarking analysis of utilities. For instance, the
definition in a price-cap regulation model of the X-factor, which varies between
companies and  reflects the level of inefficiency of the company, can be based on the
results of a benchmarking analysis. Moreover, the yardstick regulation model proposed
by Shleifer (1985), is based on a benchmarking analysis of the costs. In this model, the
regulated price for the individual firms depends on the average costs of identical firms.
 In recent years, benchmarking was introduced in many countries such as Chile,
England and Wales, Japan, Norway, Australia (New South Wales, Queensland,
Victoria) and the Netherlands.2
Regulators can use a range of techniques when benchmarking companies, from very
basic single-factor measures to econometric techniques – e.g. Corrected Ordinary Least
Squares (COLS) and Stocastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)- or mathematical programming
approaches – e.g. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).3
In this paper, we adopt the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to study 59 Swiss
electricity distribution network operators with respect to cost and scale efficiency. The
average cost model specification suggested by Filippini and Wild (2001) is utilized to
calculate individual efficiency scores. These authors estimated an average cost function
                                                
1 Cf. Laffont and Tirole (1993).
2 For a comprehensive list of countries adopting benchmarking cf. Jamasb and Pollitt (2001).
3 For a presentation and discussion of these methods see Kumbhakar and Lowell (2000) and Coelli et. al.
(1998).
2for the Swiss electricity distribution sector using a GLS estimation technique. 4 In their
studies, these authors considered only the cost of network operation. 5 In the current
paper, the average cost model used by these authors is estimated using stochastic
frontier analysis.
Swiss electricity distribution industry
The Swiss electricity industry is composed of about 1,200 utilities, with about 90
percent of them publicly owned distributors that provide power to their communities
exclusively. About 140 of them also generate power, but generally, the amount of
generated power is small and is determined by the ability to exploit favorable
hydroelectric power generation possibilities. Several different types of actors are
operating in the transmission and distribution of electricity:6
- Fully vertically integrated utilities (T, R, L, G): BKW, CKW, EWZ
- Pure transmission (and generation) companies (T, G): ATEL, EGL, EOS, NOK
- Regional network operator and resellers (R, [G]): They buy electricity from the
transmission (extra high voltage) network companies and sell it to local distributors.
They mainly operate the high voltage network and some of them have their own
generation.
- Regional distributors (R, L, [G]): They buy electricity from the transmission (extra
high voltage) network companies and sell it to customers who are connected to the
medium and low voltage grid. They operate the high, medium and low voltage grid
and some of them have their own generation.
- Local distributors (L, [G]): They buy electricity from the regional (high voltage)
network operators (resellers) and sell it to customers who are connected to the
medium and low voltage grid. They operate the medium and low voltage grid and
some of them have their own generation.
Moreover, there are combinations of these types of distributors, e.g. mixed regional
network operator and regional distributors who are resellers in parts of their territory
and directly deliver power to final consumers in other areas.
There is great divergence in size and activity among these utilities: The smallest ones
sell not more than 0.1 GWh and the largest ones sell over 10,000 GWh, which still is
                                                
4 The estimation of cost functions in the electricity distribution industry are well documented in empirical
research cf. Neuberg (1977) and Pollitt (1995) for the estimation of average cost functions and Nelson
and Primeaux (1988), Salvanes and Tjøtta (1994), Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996), Filippini (1996),
Hayashi, Goo, and Chamberlain (1997) and Filippini (1998) for the estimation of total cost functions.
5 In the empirical literature on electricity distribution, most studies estimate cost functions, which also
include the expenditure for purchasing electricity. However, since the regulator is only interested in
network costs, it is important to separate costs of network operation and costs for purchasing electricity
and only consider the former.
6 T: Transmission (extra high voltage, 220/380 kV);
R: Regional distribution (high voltage, 150-50 kV);
L: Local distribution (medium and low voltage, 30 kV – 220 V);
G: Generation
3only about one fifth of the sales of the average regional electricity company in the UK.
Moreover, in Switzerland, the average number of persons served by an electric utility is
approximately 6,000, whereas in the UK it is about 1.8 million. However, the largest
100 utilities in Switzerland account for 75 percent of total electricity sales to end-users
whereas the smallest 980 or so utilities for the remaining 25 percent.
The regional and local electric utilities purchase power mainly from seven so-called
“Ueberlandwerke” – the vertically integrated utilities and transmission companies
mentioned above –, which form the backbone of the industry. These larger companies
provide most of the generated electricity. Moreover, these dominant companies own and
control the national grid that is planned and used in close cooperation.
Deregulation of electricity distribution
With the planned introduction of the new Electricity Market Law (EML) in 2003, the
electricity sector of Switzerland will be reformed by moving from regulation to
liberalization of some parts of this industry. All customers will have the free choice of
energy supplier, hence introducing competition in energy generation and sale activities.
The EML stipulates gradual market liberalization over six years. During an initial phase
of three years, about 100 electricity consumers with a demand of over 20 GWh per
annum can buy electricity from the producer of their choice. Additionally, distributors
are allowed to procure from the market 20 percent of their electricity sales to non-
eligible customers. This results in a 30 percent market opening. During the second
phase, about 250 consumers with a demand of over 10 GWh per year have market
access, and distributors may buy 40 percent of their sales from the competitive market,
which corresponds to a market opening of 50 percent. After six years, the electricity
market will be fully open to competition, which goes beyond the requirements of the
EU electricity market directive.
The access to the transmission and distribution network will be organized subject to a
regulated third party access (TPA) model with point-of-connection (“postage stamp”)
network prices. All transmission and distribution network owners will have the
obligation to provide non-discriminatory access to the network. The transmission grid
will be operated by one independent grid company, which will be privately-owned with
the condition that the majority of capital be held by Swiss parties. At the same time, the
distribution grid operators will only be required to keep separate accounting for
distribution activities on the one hand and sales or production activities on the other
hand.
The EML will regulate the transmission and distribution prices with an approach that is
principally based on rate-of-return (ROR) regulation. The ROR regulation allows the
utility to set prices that cover its operating and capital costs as well as a return on
capital. Moreover, Article 6 of the law states that transmission and distribution prices
should reflect costs of an “efficiently operated network company”. Therefore, this
article of the new EML will give the regulator the possibility to apply benchmarking or
yardstick competition to regulate network access prices.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, a cost frontier model for the
electricity distribution industry is developed. In section 3 a data set of 59 Swiss
electricity distributors, which will be used in the empirical analysis, is presented.
Section 4 summarizes the estimation results and gives some insights on scale and cost
4efficiency of the electricity distribution industry in Switzerland. In section 5, results are
summarized and some conclusions are drawn.
2. Cost frontier model for electricity distribution
The stochastic cost frontier model
A frontier cost function defines minimum costs given output level, input prices and the
existing production technology. It is unlikely that all firms will operate at the frontier.
Failure to attain the cost frontier implies the existence of technical and allocative
inefficiency.
In this paper we consider the estimation of a stochastic frontier cost function using
panel data.7 To illustrate this econometric approach consider the cost function:
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In this specification the error term is composed of two parts: the first, ui, is a one-sided
non negative disturbance reflecting the effect of cost; the second, vit , is a two-sided
disturbance capturing the effect of noise. The statistical noise is assumed to follow a
normal distribution, and the inefficiency term ui is generally assumed to follow either a
half normal or truncated normal distribution. 8
In a stochastic frontier setting the efficiency is measured as the ratio of actual costs to
least cost level:
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following expression:
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7 Different approaches can be used to estimate a frontier cost function with panel data. A good overview
is given by Battese (1992), Simar (1992) and Fabbri, Fazioli and Filippini (1996). For applications of the
stochastic frontier methodology with panel data in Switzerland cf. Filippini and Prioni (1994) on the
regional bus industry and Filippini (1999) and Crivelli, Filippini and Lunati (2001) on nursing homes.
8 The inefficiency term ui might also have a time trend (cf. Battese and Coelli, 1992).
5These predictions are made using the procedure suggested by Jondrow et al. (1982).
Specification of the frontier cost function
The costs of operating a distribution system are the costs of building and maintaining
the system of service lines, mains and transformers, and of measuring and billing
electricity. Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) draw up a comprehensive list of the factors
these costs may depend upon:
(a) the maximum demand on the system;
(b) the total number of customers served;
(c) the type of consumer;
(d) the dispersion of the consumers;
(e) the size of the distribution area;
(f) the total kWh sold;
(g) system security;
(h) the length of distribution line and
(i) the transformer capacity.
However, the last two factors, the length of the distribution line and the transformer
capacity, are inputs rather than output characteristics and therefore should not be
included in the model. Moreover, Shleifer emphasized that only “observable
characteristics that cannot be altered by the firm” should be used to model the
heterogeneity of output. To overcome serious multicollinearity problems, we are
incorporating the different effects suggested by Burns and Weyman-Jones mostly in
terms of relative rather than absolute variables.
In our model we distinguish three different network levels (high, medium, and low
voltage). The main output is kWh transported on the medium-voltage grid. Additional
variables for the high- and low-voltage grid are included. Maximum demand is
embodied in form of the load factor (LF), which is the relation between average and
maximum demand. To account for the heterogeneity of consumers we differentiate
between two customer groups (medium- and low-voltage customers) with their
respective average consumption levels. The dispersion of consumers and the structure of
the service area are modeled by the incorporation of a customer-density variable and
variables indicating the area shares of different ground categories. System security
should also be used as an output indicator. Unfortunately, we are not able to include
system security variables in our specification because no data are available.
The inputs to the operation of the distribution system consist primarily of labor and
capital. Assuming that output and input prices are exogenous, and that (for a given
technology) firms adjust input levels so as to minimize costs of distribution, the firm's
total average cost of operating the electricity distribution system can be represented by
the average cost function
6AC  =  C / Y  =  AC ( Y,  PL,  PC,  HGRID,  LVSH,  AVGL,  LF,
CD,  AGSH,  FOSH,  UPSH,  OTSH ) (4)
where C represents total cost, AC represents average cost per kWh and Y is the output
represented by the total number of kWh transported on the medium-voltage grid. PL
and PC are the prices of labor and capital, respectively. 9 HGRID is a dummy variable to
separate distribution utilities that are also operating a high-voltage grid. LVSH
represents the share of electricity that is delivered on the low-voltage network. This
variable considers the differences among the utilities in terms of customer structure.
AVGL is the average consumption per low voltage customer. LF is the load factor and
CD is the customer density measured in customers per hectare of settlement land.
AGSH represents the share of agricultural land, FOSH represents the share of forestland
and UPSH indicates the share of unproductive land with respect to the total size of the
service area, respectively. OTSH is a variable used to control for outputs other than the
distribution of electricity that are included in the accounting data of electric utilities. We
use the share of “other revenues” on total revenues as output indicator for these
activities.
Using a linear function, equation (2) can be approximated by the following average cost
function:
LVSHHGRIDPCPLYYAC LSHGPCPLYYY bbbbbbb ++++++=
2
0
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The output Y and the customer density CD are included in linear and quadratic form to
allow nonlinear variations of the average-cost function.
3.  Data
This study is based on the panel data set of Swiss electricity distribution utilities that
was previously used by Filippini and Wild (2001). The primary data sources were the
(unpublished) Swiss Federal Office of Energy’s financial statistics of electricity
utilities; additional data on customers, output and technical characteristics were
collected using a mail questionnaire sent to the utilities. Service area characteristics are
taken from the Swiss Federal Office of Statistic’s area statistics (“Arealstatistik”). The
data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 59 electricity distribution utilities over the
                                                
9 In this study we adopted a simple unbundling of costs between the network activities and the purchasing
activities: only the costs of electricity purchasing belong to the supply, all the other costs belong to the
network. This seems a reasonable approach because the supply activities in comparison to the network
operation need only a limited amount of resources in terms of labor and capital. In addition, this simple
unbundling mechanism considers the fact that the regulator is subject to asymmetric information and
normally cannot observe subcosts.
7period 1988-1996 (380 observations). All input prices and costs were deflated to 1996
constant Swiss francs using the Swiss Consumer Price Index. Descriptive statistics of
the variables are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Description Dimension 1. Quartile Median 3. Quartile
AC Average cost Swiss cents / kWh 5.86 7.95 10.03
Y Output GWh 67.6 104.6 198.7
PL Price labor 1000 CHF / employee 82.6 97.0 113.5
PK Price capital CHF / kVA 62.6 88.1 123.5
HGRID High voltage grid Dummy 0 0 1
LVSH Low voltage sales Share 0.59 0.74 0.90
LF Load factor 0.52 0.56 0.59
AVGL Average consumption low voltage kWh / customer 5'995 6'689 7'424
CD Customer density Customer / ha 14.92 19.51 22.92
AGSH Agricultural land Share 0.22 0.34 0.42
FOSH Forest land Share 0.22 0.30 0.40
UPSH Unproductive land Share 0.01 0.02 0.06
OTSH Other activities Share 0.03 0.07 0.13
84. Empirical analysis
Estimation results
The results of the estimation are listed in Table 2. The OLS-coefficients are estimated
using an Ordinary Least Squares technique. These coefficients are just an estimate of a
linear cost function and don’t allow any inefficiency predictions. They are listed only
for comparison with the coefficients of the stochastic frontier models (Model 1 and 2).
Model 1 uses a half-normal distribution of the inefficiency term and in Model 2, the
inefficiency term is specified as a more general truncated normal distribution in which m
can be non-zero. In both models, the firm specific inefficiency term ui is assumed to be
constant over time.10 Model 1 and 2 are estimated with a program named Frontier 4.1 by
Tim Coelli (1996), which uses a three-step estimation method.11
Table 2 Parameter estimates
OLS Model 1(half normal)
Model 2
(truncated normal)
Coefficient(a) t-Value Coefficient(a) t-Value Coefficient(a) t-Value
Constant 9.198599*** 7.73 8.856186*** 6.52 5.894395*** 4.57
Y -0.006340*** -8.63 -0.007455*** -4.81 -0.005434*** -3.74
Y2 0.000003*** 7.62 0.000003*** 3.66 0.000002*** 3.08
PL 0.008076*** 3.49 0.0073** 2.54 0.006942* 2.13
PK 0.040815*** 18.33 0.028496*** 14.89 0.029167*** 15.70
HGRID 1.604792*** 7.59 2.369328*** 3.58 1.678294*** 3.32
LVSH 4.460230*** 7.73 6.120588*** 5.94 6.297858*** 6.53
AVGL -0.000471*** -7.43 -0.000665*** -7.33 -0.00073*** -8.27
LF -11.152949*** -9.65 -7.590265*** -7.97 -7.79334*** -8.68
AGSH 5.088802*** 6.52 2.625975 1.75 5.978271*** 4.65
FOSH 7.476540*** 10.11 6.097725*** 3.95 6.956755*** 4.99
UPSH 2.051194** 2.53 -0.589187 -0.38 2.181759 1.49
CD -0.377348*** -7.44 -0.462682*** -4.96 -0.390504*** -4.62
CD2 0.007631*** 8.05 0.00859*** 4.34 0.007577*** 4.38
OTSH 0.098326*** 9.25 0.133963*** 13.15 0.134725*** 13.52
m 2.759906*** 5.19
(a) ***, **, *: significant at 0.1%, 1%, 5%
Most of the parameter estimates of all three models show the expected sign and are
highly significant. Generally, the frontier models show the same influence of exogenous
                                                
10 Models that allowed ui to have a time trend were estimated; but no significant time trend was found in
any specification of the cost model.
11 For further information, please refer to the mentioned working paper.
9variables on average costs as the OLS model. Although there are some differences in
the size of the coefficients, they are all pretty similar except the constant. The constant
in Model 2 is smaller than the one in Model 1, but this can be explained by the
estimation of m. In model 1, m is restricted to zero and so, the constant has to absorb a
potential divergence from zero. Another indicator for this fact is that the constant in the
OLS estimation is quite as high as in Model 1.
The coefficient of the load factor (LF) of the OLS model is higher than the ones of the
two efficiency models. This can be interpreted as a potential source of inefficiency,
because if the load factor increases, than the average costs would fall more in the OLS
model than in the others. This means that when corrected by inefficiency, the load factor
looses part of its effect and thus, the average costs would be lower.
Returns to scale and density
According to Roberts (1986), the inclusion of the number of customers and the size of
the service territory in the cost function of network industries allows for the distinction
of returns to output density, returns to customer density and returns to scale. Returns to
scale (RS) measure the reaction of costs to an equal proportional increase in output,
number of customers and size of the service area. In terms of our model specification
this is equal to an expansion of output, holding output density and customer density
constant. It can be shown that returns to scale – the effect of an expansion of Y, holding
AVGL and CD constant on total costs - can be derived from the average cost elasticity
with respect to Y, as follows12
AC
Y
Y
AC
RS
¶
¶
+
=
1
1
(6)
Returns to customer density (RCD) measure the reaction of costs to an equal
proportional increase of output and the number of customers, holding the size of the
service area fixed. In terms of our model specification, this corresponds to an equal
proportional expansion of output and customer density, holding output density constant.
Returns to customer density can be derived from the average cost elasticity with respect
to Y and CD, as follows:
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Finally, returns to output density (ROD) measure the reaction of costs to an increase in
output holding the size of the service area and the number of customers fixed. In terms
of our model specification, this corresponds to a proportional expansion of output and
                                                
12 The definitions for RS, RCD and ROD for the average cost function used in this study are derived in
Wild (2001, p. 198ff.).
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average consumption per customer, holding customer density constant. Returns to
output density can be derived from the average cost elasticity with respect to Y and
AVGL, as follows
AC
AVGL
AVGL
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ROD
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=
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1
(8)
Returns to scale or density are said to be increasing, constant or decreasing, when RS,
RCD or ROD are greater than unity, equal to unity, or less than unity, respectively.
Although these definitions are based on the average cost specification, they correspond
to – and can be compared with – those suggested by Roberts (1986) for the total cost
function. The resulting returns to scale and density at the median values of the sample
are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 Returns to scale and density (evaluated at median values of variables)
OLS Model 1(half normal)
Model 2
(truncated normal)
Returns to scale (RS) 1.082 1.098 1.070
Returns to customer density (RCD) 1.372 1.674 1.425
Returns to output density (ROD) 1.894 2.848 3.118
We find increasing returns to scale for the electricity distribution utilities in our sample.
In Figure 1 the scale expansion paths of the average costs are shown for the OLS
estimates and for the two frontier specifications.
Our results suggest that returns to scale evaluated for the frontier average cost functions
(Model 1 and 2) are similar to the returns to scale of the OLS function. Most of the
utilities in our sample therefore are too small and do not reach the minimum efficient
scale (the median utility delivers about 110 GWh). The problem of scale inefficiency
might be solved by mergers between the small utilities.
In addition, there are significant economies of customer density and economies of
output density. Average distribution costs fall the more densely populated a service area
is, and the higher the average consumption per customer (i.e. the output density) is.
However, the returns to density can not be altered by the network operators, since they
are characteristics of the service area that are determined by exogenous factors.
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Figure 1 Scale expansion paths of the average costs (all three voltage levels)
Cost efficiency
The estimation results reported in Table 2 can be used to recover estimates of the level
of cost inefficiency of each electricity utility along the line suggested by Simar (1992)
and Coelli and Battese (1996). The inefficiency indicator can be interpreted as the ratio
of actual costs to the efficient level of costs as presented in expression in expression (3)
in section 2. Table 4 shows some summary statistics of efficiency scores (EFF) for both
models calculated for the electricity utilities of our sample.13 The estimated cost
efficiency scores of each individual firm are reported in Table 5 in the Appendix. The
estimated variances of V and U are listed in Table 6.
Table 4 Statistics on efficiency scores (EFF)
1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Average
EFF Model 1 1.1553 1.3292 1.5941 1.4909
EFF Model 2 1.3137 1.5149 1.7966 1.6671
                                                
13 EFF is calculated as the ratio of actual costs to the efficient level of costs. The values of the inefficiency
scores can be interpreted as follows: an efficiency score of 1.3292 means that the firm’s cost are 32.92%
higher than the cost of an equivalent firm that is efficient.
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Median cost inefficiencies in model 1 is about 33%; which is somewhat lower than the
median value of 51% received in Model 2. This shows that the efficiency scores are
sensitive with respect to assumptions on the distribution of the firm effect ui (half
normal and truncated normal respectively). However, there is a clear positive
correlation between the efficiency scores (the Pearson correlation between efficiency
scores in the two models is 0.586). Unfortunately, the efficiency scores of some firms
differ substantially in the two models: Especially firm 59, which has an efficiency score
of 4.39 in Model 1, is evaluated as 100% efficient in Model 2.
A likelihood ratio test favors Model 2 (truncated normal distribution of firm effects) at
an 98% significance level, which – on average – postulates higher inefficiency levels.
5. Summary and conclusions
In most countries, deregulation of the electricity industry comes along with a (re-)
regulation of the network access prices. To give the network operators efficiency
incentives, access price regulation is often implemented with incentive oriented
regulatory instruments such as price-cap regulation or yardstick competition.
The new Swiss electricity market law states that network access prices should reflect
costs of an “efficiently operated network company”. One way to calculate the costs of
an efficient network is to perform a benchmarking analysis and specify a best practice.
In this paper we applied the stochastic frontier methodology to predict the efficient
technology.
However, the main goal of the analysis did not consist in the calculation of efficiency
scores for individual firms. More importance was laid on the one hand on the
investigation of the characteristics of cost function in terms of returns to scale and
density and on the other hand on the determination of the influences of service area
characteristics on costs. Our results that are based on panel data for a sample of 59
Swiss electricity distributors (380 observations) might be of interest for the regulator.
Our main findings are:
- The parameter estimates in the average cost model have the expected sign and are
highly significant (most of them at the 99.9% significance level). The explanatory
power of the model is rather high: with the OLS-specification, more than 80% of the
variation of average costs can be explained.
- Exogenous heterogeneity variables have significant and measurable influence on
distribution cost. These are the customer density, the customer structure (medium
and low voltage customers), the average consumption per customer, and shares of
different land categories (forest, farm and unproductive land) in the service area.
- Frontier functions were calculated for two assumptions on the distribution on the
firm specific error term (half normal and truncated normal distribution). The results
of the two models are similar. However, the efficiency scores for some utilities are
rather sensitive with respect to the assumed distribution. A likelihood ratio test
between the two models supports the truncated normal distribution.
- The truncated normal model suggests that the median utility has excess costs of
about 50% compared to the cost frontier. This suggests that there exists a substantial
13
potential for augmentations of efficiency that might be realized by the incentive
oriented regulation of access prices.
- We find increasing returns to scale (1.07 for the median utility in the truncated
normal model), which says that an increase in total cost by 10% would enable an
expansion of firm size (in terms of GWh, number of customers and area size) of
10.7%. Minimum efficient scale is reached with an output of about 1000 GWh per
year, which corresponds to about 100’000 customers. Since the median utility in
Switzerland has less than 10’000 customers, electricity distribution is characterized
by notable scale inefficiency.
- Moreover, increasing returns to output and customer density are found. These
results are rather typical in network industries.
It is planed to extend our analysis in two directions:
(1) we are interested in the robustness of results (different distribution assumptions on
firm specific inefficiency; variation of sample; changes in theoretical model);
(2) comparison of parametric (stochastic frontier analysis) and non-parametric methods
(data envelopment analysis).
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5. Appendix: Efficiency scores
Table 5 Efficiency scores of the individual firms
Firm Model 1 Model 2 Firm Model 1 Model 2
1 1.4787 1.5358 31 1.1553 1.2439
2 1.2746 1.6591 32 1.1298 1.2469
3 1.4746 1.9215 33 1.4932 2.0184
4 1.4933 1.6130 34 1.3163 1.5641
5 1.2619 1.3850 35 1.1818 1.9793
6 1.0617 1.3467 36 1.2881 2.6590
7 1.4253 1.3898 37 1.0403 1.1228
8 1.4591 1.6494 38 1.1192 1.3490
9 1.3907 1.5284 39 1.1416 1.1964
10 1.2918 1.3235 40 1.0218 1.0413
11 1.5941 1.8848 41 1.7019 1.6368
12 1.3806 1.3976 42 1.0332 1.1046
13 1.6599 1.7534 43 1.3292 1.4314
14 1.1658 1.3296 44 1.1960 1.4326
15 1.0310 1.0424 45 1.0143 1.0325
16 1.2527 1.3797 46 3.5066 5.1323
17 1.0789 1.2565 47 1.0667 1.2814
18 1.6619 1.8127 48 1.2109 1.3142
19 1.5377 1.5008 49 2.0364 2.5975
20 3.2436 3.1371 50 1.8484 2.4742
21 1.2820 1.2889 51 1.5402 1.7883
22 1.5136 1.6848 52 1.3382 1.5748
23 1.0582 1.2524 53 1.0943 1.1305
24 1.1160 1.4533 54 1.5354 1.4826
25 1.9734 2.9131 55 1.1583 1.3137
26 1.3050 1.5149 56 1.9556 2.2553
27 1.3826 1.7966 57 1.7203 1.8628
28 1.6388 1.6381 58 2.0712 2.2843
29 1.1961 1.7779 59 4.3900 1.0000
30 1.6472 1.6432 Average 1.4909 1.6671
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Table 6 Estimated variances of  U and V
Parameter Model 1 Model 2
222 ˆˆˆ uv sss += 7.6122 2.6606
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